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3623 REVIEW GRANTED An attorney may be liable for malicious prosecution for continuing to prosecute an action after learning that there is no probable cause for maintaining it, even though the attorney reasonably believed there was probable cause when instituting the action; continuing to prosecute an action after learning that it lacks probable cause may be evidence of a desire to subvert the judicial system, which is a form of malice; if induced by materially false facts, denial of a motion for summary judgment does not establish that probable cause for the action existed; a party whose only involvement in an alleged malicious prosecution is as a witness is not liable for malicious prosecution, even if s/he commits perjury while testifying.CitationZAMOS v STROUD (Malicious Continuation) 110 CA4 60 [See: CCP 425.16; Sheldon Appel v Albert 47 C3 863; Vanzant v Daimler 96 CA4 1283, T/AT 4/02; SwatFame v Goldstein 101 CA4 613, T/AT 10/02; Roberts v Sentry 76 CA4 375, T/AT 12/99; Downey v LMI 66 CA4 478, T/AT 10/98]
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