4041 The SLAPP statute applied to various actions against persons who conducted demonstrations at plaintiff's residence regarding plaintiff's employment by a company that performed medical research on animals; collateral estoppel did not prevent granting defendant's SLAPP motion even though the court had issued a preliminary injunction against further such conduct by them; an individual suing for harassment can make out a prima facie case in the face of conduct that was found to constitute "true threats," but a corporation can not; the finding that defendants' conduct constituted "true threats" supported plaintiff's ability to make out prima facie cases of harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy; coupled with plaintiff's allegations of actual damage to real and personal property the threats also served as the basis of plaintiff's prima facie case under the Unfair Competition Law; allegations that defendants transported persons who then unlawfully entered plaintiff's realty were not sufficient to support an action for trespass to land; in the absence of a special relationship that might result in the imposition on defendants of a duty to avoid inflicting emotional distress on plaintiff, their behavior did not support plaintiff's action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.CitationHUNTINGDON LIFE SCIENCES v STOP HUNTINGDON ANIMAL CRUELTY (Animal Activists) 129 CA4 1228 [See: CCP 527.6, 527.8, 425.16; B&PC 17200 etseq; Paul for Council v Hanyecz 85 CA4 1356, T/AT 2/01; Lam v Ngo 91 CA4 832, T/AT 9/01]
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